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EQUITY-ESTOPPEL APPLIED AGAINST THE
STATE. Stuckey's Stores, Inc. v. O'Chesky, 93 N.M. 312, 600
P.2d 258 (1979).

The New Mexico Supreme Court most recently applied the
equitable estoppel doctrine against the state' in Stuckey's Stores,
Inc. v. O'Chesky. 2 In that case the court held that the New Mexico
Highway Department was equitably estopped from claiming that the
plaintiffs' advertising signs were subject to removal without just
compensation to the owners.' The court could employ estoppel
against the state in Stuckey's due to the doctrine's evolution in New
Mexico during the past three decades. To understand that evolution,
it is useful to examine previous New Mexico estoppel decisions. This
Note analyzes Stuckey's and earlier New Mexico decisions in order
to identify situations and circumstances which trigger judicial application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the state. It also
discusses policy considerations concerning use of the doctrine
against public bodies.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE STATE
Equitable estoppel is
the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting
rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of
property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person,
who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been
led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his
part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of
contract, or of remedy."
Historically, the doctrine of equitable estoppel was not applied
1. The words "state," "sovereign," and "public body" are used interchangeably throughout this Note to denote any governmental entity.
2. 93 N.M. 312, 600 P.2d 258 (1979).
3. Jd. at __, 600 P.2d at 270.
4. 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 804 (4th ed. 1918).
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against the sovereign in the absence of a statute to the contrary.5 The
practical effect of this rule was to make equitable estoppel virtually
inapplicable to the state because such statutes were rare. This traditional rule evolved from the doctrine of sovereign immunity." In
many jurisdictions, however, courts have been persuaded by social
policy arguments to replace the doctrine of sovereign immunity with
a doctrine of sovereign responsibility.7 The traditional view has been
eroded by changes in social philosophy. For example, it was once
feared that the financial burden to the state would be intolerable if it
were not protected by sovereign immunity against a claim of estoppel.' Another argument in favor of sovereign immunity and against
equitable estoppel was the belief that the state's taxpayers should not
be responsible for the mistakes or misdeeds of its public officers or
agencies.' Both concerns can now be partially eliminated by means
of adequate insurance coverage."° Moreover, modern ideas of social
justice will not allow the full misfortune from such a mistake or
misdeed to fall on a single individual or small group." As a result of
this gradual shift in values, courts have begun to depart from the
traditional position and have permitted application of equitable
estoppel against the state when right and justice so demand. 2
EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE IN NEW MEXICO
The Supreme Court of New Mexico acknowledged in two early
cases that equitable estoppel may be applied against the state under
certain circumstances and when justice so requires.' 3 In Westerman
5. See Ross v. Daniel, 53 N.M. 70, 201 P.2d 993 (1949); Jenness v. Payne, 81 N.H. 308, 125
A. 679 (1924).
6. See Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. State Highway Dep't v. Shaw, 90 N.M. 485, 565 P.2d 655 (1977); United States v.
Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 164, 531 P.2d 212 (Ct. App. 1975); Silver City Consol. School
Dist. No. I v. Board of Regents, 75 N.M. 106, 401 P.2d 95 (1965). See also National Advertising Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 91 N.M. 191, 571 P.2d 1194 (1977); Peltz v. New Mexico
Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 89 N.M. 276, 551 P.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1976); State Highway
Dep't v. Yurcic, 85 N.M. 220, 511 P.2d 546 (1973); Comment, Emergence of an Equitable
Doctrine of Estoppel Against the Government-The Oil Shale Cases, 46 U. Colo. L. Rev. 433
(1974-1975); and cases cited in note 41 infra.
13. City of Carlsbad v. Neal, 56 N.M. 465, 245 P.2d 384 (1952); Westerman v. City of
Carlsbad, 55 N.M. 550, 237 P.2d 356 (1951).

Summer 1980]

EQUI TY

v. City of Carlsbad,'4 the court listed the essential elements of
equitable estoppel. As related to the estopped party, the elements
are: 1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or conceal-

ment of material facts, 2) intention or expectation that such conduct
will be acted upon by the other party, and 3) knowledge of the real
facts. 'I As related to the party claiming estoppel, the elements are: 1)
lack of knowledge as to the truth of facts in question, 2) reliance
upon the conduct of the party estopped, and 3) action based on the
conduct which prejudicially changed the claimant's position.' 6 In
Carlsbad v. Neal, I7the court held that the presence of facts or circumstances sufficient to apply estoppel must be determined by the
jury.' 8 Although these cases did not apply equitable estoppel against
the city, they contain the court's first acknowledgement that the
most just result in a particular case may be achieved by use of the
estoppel doctrine.
In 1965, in Silver City Consolidated School District No. I v.
Board of Regents, 9 the New Mexico Supreme Court applied the
doctrine of equitable estoppel against a public body for the first
time. The court's language indicated some hesitancy: "We recognize
that estoppel in its'usual sense is not generally applicable against a
sovereign in the exercise of governmental functions, but where right
and justice demand it, the doctrine will be applied . ...,20 The
facts of this case were particularly persuasive to the court because
both parties were public entities. 2 '
Since the Silver City decision, the New Mexico courts have con14. 55 N.M. 550, 237 P.2d 356 (1951). In Westerman, a former city employee brought a
breach of contract suit against the city of Carlsbad. The court found that the elements of estoppel had not been pleaded, so estoppel could not apply. See also State Highway Dep't v. Yurcic,
85 N.M. 220, 511 P.2d 546(1973).
15. Westerman v. City of Carlsbad, 55 N.M. at 555, 237 P.2d at 359.
16. Id. at 555-56, 237 P.2d at 359.
17. 56 N.M. 465, 245 P.2d 384 (1952). The Neal case was an ejectment proceeding with a
counterclaim to quiet title in land claimed by the city to be part of a street. The trial court
directed the verdict for the city. The supreme court reversed and remanded for a determination
of the issues bya jury.
18. Id. at 472, 245 P.2d at 389.
19. 75 N.M. 106, 401 P.2d 95 (1965).
20. Id. at I 11,401 P.2d at 99. Silver City involved a mandamus proceeding to require the
board of regents of New Mexico Western College to transfer a high school building, previously
operated by the college, to the Silver City school district. The statute which had allowed the
construction and the original funding of the building required such a transfer if the college
ceased to operate the high school. At the time of the suit, the college was no longer operating
the high school. The court held that the college was estopped from claiming the invalidity of
the statute under which it had received benefits for 20 years.
21. If both parties to a lawsuit are public bodies, application of estoppel is appropriate
because any potential danger to the sovereign is equalized by the potential benefit.
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sidered the application of estoppel against the state several times
with varying results. 22 In State Highway Department v. Yurcic,

23

the

court held that the state was not estopped from abandoning a condemnation proceeding because all elements of estoppel had not been
pleaded. 2' However, in a later case also involving a condemnation
proceeding, State Highway Department v. Shaw, the court applied
the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the state. 2 There the court
prevented the State Highway Department from denying recovery to
several landowners for the value of land which had been enhanced
due to its proximity to a proposed freeway. 26 The defendants had
relied on verbal assurances, the grant of a driveway permit, a letter
from the Highway Department, and right-of-way maps in purchasing the property. 7
A 1977 case, National Advertising Co. v. State,2 8 involved an
estoppel issue similar to that in Stuckey's. In NationalAdvertising,
sign owners brought suit against the state seeking compensation for
signs removed by the state pursuant to the Highway Beautification
Act.2 9 The supreme court found that the state was not estopped from
requiring the removal of billboards at the owner's expense because
language on the permits provided that the permits could be revoked
and the signs removed at the expense of the owners. The court did,
22. In United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 164, 531 P.2d 212 (Ct. App. 1975), the
court found the state to be estopped from collecting taxes which, in written opinions, state officials had classified as not owed. These facts were so compelling that the court noted that failure
to apply estoppel in this case may have risen to the level of an unconstitutional change in
policy. In another estoppel case, Peltz v. New Mexico Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 89
N.M. 276, 551 P.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1976), a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, in an attempt to attain financial independence, voluntarily terminated the assistance
over four months before reapplying for aid. She was not told, until she tried to return to the
program, that an absence of four months would cause her to lose her eligibility. She claimed
that the caseworker's failure to notify her of the time limit regulation estopped the Department
from applying it. The court held that the Department was not estopped because the caseworker
had no duty to notify Ms. Peltz of the regulation.
23. 85 N.M. 220, 511 P.2d 546 (1973). In an eminent domain proceeding, the Yurcics
claimed damages resulting from their reliance on the Highway Department's plan to condemn
land and the Department's subsequent abandonment of the condemnation suit.
24. Id. at 223, 511 P.2d at 549. The court suggested that, for estoppel to lie in a condemnation case, the comdemnors must engage in a "rather shocking degree of aggravated and overreaching conduct." Although merely dictum, according to Appellees' Answer Brief at 47, this
language may have influenced the trial court in Stuckey's to find that estoppel was not appropriate in that case. Appellees' Answer Brief at 47, Stuckey's Stores, Inc. v. O'Chesky, 93 N.M.
312, 600 P.2d 258 (1979). The supreme court's reversal on that issue in Stuckey's indicates that
the court did not intend for its statement in Yurcic to have broad application.
25. 90 N.M. 485, 565 P.2d 655 (1977).
26. Id. at 486, 565 P.2d at 657.
27. Id.
28. 91 N.M. 191, 571 P.2d 1194 (1977).
29. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 67-12-1 to -14 (1978).
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however, recognize the applicability of the estoppel doctrine against
the sovereign when all elements are present and justice is best served
by its application.3 0
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE STATE
AS APPLIED IN STUCKEY'S
Stuckey's Stores, Inc. v. O'Chesky1 involved the effect of the
New Mexico Highway Beautification Act on the plaintiffs, Stuckey's
Stores and its New Mexico franchisees. The plaintiff franchisees
owned land adjacent to rights-of-way of interstate and primary highways in New Mexico. Advertising signs for Stuckey's which did not
comply with the Act's requirements were located on these lands.
Pursuant to the Act, the State Highway Department sought to
remove the signs without compensation to the sign owners.3" The
plaintiffs contended that the Department was estopped from claiming that certain signs could be taken without payment of just compensation because the plaintiffs had relied on the Department's permission to relocate the signs.33
After a nonjury trial, judgment was entered against the plaintiffs
on all issues. The plaintiffs appealed and the New Mexico Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the district court in part and reversed
in part. The supreme court held that the Department was equitably
estopped from claiming that the plaintiffs' signs were subject to
removal without just compensation, thus reversing the district
court's decision on this issue.3" The supreme court based its reversal
on the fact that a Highway Department official indicated to the
plaintiffs that the signs would be considered "on-premise" signs for
which compensation would be paid if they were later acquired by the
Department.3 5 The court also found that the district court erred in
finding that the plaintiffs had failed to show reliance on the Department's representations.3 6 The court said that "[bly granting permis30. 91 N.M. at 194, 571 P.2d at 1197.
31. 93 N.M. 312, 600 P.2d 258 (1979).
32. 93 N.M. at __
,600 P.2d 269-70; see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-12-6(C) (1978).
33. 93 N.M. at __
, 600 P.2d at 269. The plaintiffs also asserted that the Act abridged
their freedom of speech, that it violated the just compensation and due process clauses of the
United States and New Mexico constitutions, that the signs were lawfully erected entitling the
plaintiffs to just compensation if they were condemned by the state, and that the state had
waived its right to claim it could destroy the signs. Id. at _
-, 600 P.2d at 260, 261.
34. 93 N.M. at __
, 600 P.2d at 270. The court also held that the Act did not abridge
plaintiffs' constitutional rights, that the signs were not lawfully erected, and that the state had
waived its right to claim it could destroy the signs due to untimely payment because it accepted
plaintiffs' late permit fees. Id. at __
, 600 P.2d at 262-69.
35. Appellees' Answer Brief at 46.
36. 93 N.M. at __, 600 P.2d at 270.
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sion to plaintiffs to relocate the signs, the Department's conduct
conveyed to plaintiffs that the right to compensation would not be
affected. Plaintiffs acted upon that permission as is evidenced by the
fact that the signs were moved to new locations soon after the permission was granted." 37
In deciding the estoppel issue, the supreme court cited two
previous New Mexico decisions as authority for the essential
elements of equitable estoppel.38 It did not, however, distinguish
Stuckey's from those two previous cases which appeared to deny
that estoppel could lie against the state. 9 The court also relied on
State Highway Department v. Shaw for the proposition that
"[riepresentations that are contrary to the essential facts to be relied
upon, even though made innocently or by mistake, will support the
application of the estoppel doctrine. ""
CONCLUSION
Many jurisdictions have departed from the traditional rule which
prohibits application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel against
the state. Courts in those jurisdictions now invoke the doctrine when
37. Id.
38. 93 N.M. at __, 600 P.2d 270 (citing State Highway Dep't v. Yurcic, 85 N.M. 220,
223, 511 P.2d 546, 549 (1973), and Westerman v. City of Carlsbad, 55 N.M. 550, 555-56, 237
P.2d 356, 359(1951)).
39. The court in Ross v. Daniel, 53 N.M. 70, 75, 201 P.2d 993, 996 (1949), held that "the
unauthorized acts of public officers do not present grounds for estoppel against the state where
such acts relate to the performance of a public duty." Since the representations made to plaintiffs in Stuckey's were made by a public officer in performance of his public duty, the court
must have found that the statements were not unauthorized acts and, therefore, estoppel could
apply. In Martinez v. Cox, 75 N.M. 417, 421, 405 P.2d 659, 662 (1965), the supreme court said
that the state, acting in its governmental capacity, may not be estopped. The facts in Martinez,
which involved a prisoner who sought a writ of habeas corpus, were essentially different from
the facts in Stuckey's. Following his conviction for unlawful possession of narcotics, Martinez
was serving a two to ten year sentence, all but 18 months of which had been suspended. He had
earned two months "good time" and three months, 24 days' "meritorious good time" which
he claimed should be deducted from his sentence. The petitioner asserted, inter alia, that the
state was estopped from denying his eligibility for release. The supreme court found that good
time could only be credited against the maximum sentence or used to determine the time of
eligibility for parole; it could not be credited against a sentence for this offense which was less
than the minimum. The court refused to hold the states estopped and articulated no reason for
its refusal. The court in Stuckey's did not find it necessary to distinguish Martinez; this fact indicates that the court chose not to apply estoppel in Martinez because the facts of that case did
not merit application of the doctrine. Therefore, Martinez should be interpreted only within its
facts.
40. 93 N.M. at

_

485, 565 P.2d 655 (1977)).

, 600 P.2d at 270 (quoting State Highway Dep't v. Shaw, 90 N.M.
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to do so is necessary to prevent injustice and fraud.4 ' The decision in
Stuckey's reemphasizes the proposition that estoppel can be asserted
against the state when New Mexico courts deem its application appropriate.' 2 The challenge to the New Mexico practitioner is to determine the circumstances under which a court will apply the doctrine.
Two absolute requirements emerge from the case law and underlie
the decision in Stuckey's. All essential elements of equitable estoppel
must be present in a case for the doctrine to be applied,4 3 but the
court focuses most often on the element of reliance." In addition,
invocation of the doctrine must be the best, perhaps the only, means
of reaching a just decision in the case."
The Silver City decision indicates that any public policy considerations which militate against use of estoppel against the sovereign
disappear when two governmental units are the adverse parties. 6
The importance of the particular facts of each case is shown by the
fact that the supreme court did not apply estoppel on behalf of sign
owners in National Advertising7 and yet found that the doctrine was

41. See Palo Alto Inv. Co. v. County of Placer, 269 Cal. App. 2d 363, 74 Cal. Rptr. 831 (Ct.
App. 1969) (equitable estoppel available against the government where justice and right require
it); New-Mark Builders, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 90 Ill. App. 2d 98, 233 N.E.2d 44 (1967)
(estoppel may be invoked against a municipality only if positive acts of municipal officers induced action of adverse party); Town of Jeffersontown v. Holloway, 269 S.W.2d 728 (Ky.
1954) (town which advertised for bids under certain description of work was estopped from
claiming work should have been done according to another description); City of Baltimore v.
Chesapeake Marine Ry. Co., 233 Md. 559, 197 A.2d 821 (1964) (municipality may be estopped
from denying that official consent did not induce expenditure of efforts and monies); Versailles Transp. Auth. v. City of McKeesport, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 377, 90 A.2d 581 (1952)
(estoppel of governmental agency by municipality); Ferrelli v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 106
R.I. 588, 261 A.2d 906 (1970) (doctrine of estoppel should be applied in some circumstances
even where a public agency is involved). See also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel § 123 (1966);
Comment, 46 U. Colo. L. Rev., supra note 12, at 433.
42. An alernative explanation of the holding in Stuckey's on the estoppel and waiver issues
is that, although the court could not hold for the plaintiffs on the constitutional questions, it
thought the claim was not entirely without merit and, therefore, reversed the decision of the
district court on waiver and estoppel. This hypothesis seems unlikely, however, in view of the
court's refusal to apply estoppel against the state except in the most compelling situations.
43. City of Carlsbad v. Neal, 56 N.M. at 472, 245 P.2d at 389; Westerman v. City of
Carlsbad, 55 N.M. 550, 237 P.2d 356(1951).
44. National Advertising Co. State Highway Dep't, 91 N.M. 191, 571 P.2d 1194 (1977);
State Highway Dep't v. Shaw, 90 N.M. 485, 565 P.2d 655 (1977); Peltz v. New Mexico Dep't
of Health and Social Servs., 89 N.M. 276, 551 P.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1976); United States v.
Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 164, 531 P.2d 212 (Ct. App. 1975); State Highway Dep't v.
Yurcic, 85 N.M. 220, 511 P.2d 546 (1973).
45. Peltz v. New Mexico Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 89 N.M. at 277, 551 P.2d at 101;
United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. at 166, 531 P.2d at 214.
46. 75 N.M. at 111,401 P.2d at 99.
47. 91 N.M. 191,571 P.2d 1194(1977).
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applicable in Stuckey's when interpreting the same statute on behalf
of different sign owners. In National Advertising, the element of
concealment was missing, whereas in Stuckey's the facts had been
concealed from the sign owners.
Public welfare is best served by holding public officers accountable for their actions and representations through appropriate use of
the estoppel doctrine. Because courts will apply equitable estoppel
against a public body where justice demands it," their continued
espousal of the traditional rule serves no purpose. It is encouraging
and significant that, in several recent cases involving an estoppel
issue, including Stuckey's, the court has not referred to the traditional rule before applying estoppel."' The court thus may be
demonstrating its intention to remove this vestige of sovereign
immunity from New Mexico law.
ROBIN DOZIER OTTEN

48. Id., and cases cited in note 45 supra.
49. Stuckey's Stores, Inc. v. O'Chesky, 93 N.M. 312, 600 P.2d 258 (1979); State Highway
Dep't v. Shaw, 90 N.M. 485, 565 P.2d 655 (1977); State Highway Dep't v. Yurcic, 85 N.M.
220, 511 P.2d 546 (1973).

